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Employees’ Pension Beneﬁts




Thep o pulation of Japan is aging rapidly. According to Ministry of
Health and Welfare of Japan projections, the proportion of the population
above the age of sixty-ﬁve years will reach about 25 percent by the year
2025. At the same time, the nation’s social security beneﬁts have increased
substantially since the 1970s, and retirees now receive a generous tax de-
duction for pension income. Because the Japanese public pension program
is organized as a pay-as-you-go system, and because the large cohort of
baby boomers will retire early in the twenty-ﬁrst century, the current bene-
ﬁt and tax structure soon will place a substantial burden on younger
workers.1
In an attempt to reduce this burden, the Japanese government has in-
stituted several modiﬁcations to the pension system. For example, whereas
full social security beneﬁts used to start at age sixty for men covered by
the Employees’ Pension program, reductions in beneﬁts to be phased in
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1. There are three major public pension programs in Japan. The Employees Pension insur-
ance system (EP) covers workers in the private sector. Public-sector employees and private-
school personnel are covered by mutual aid associations (MAAs) of several diﬀerent types.
Thes elf-employed and farmers are covered by the National Pension (NP). Extensive discus-
sionso fthe public pension system can be found in Ogura (1994) and Oguchi, Kimura, and
Hatta (1996).
273between 2001 and 2013 mean that men aged sixty to sixty-four and cov-
ered by Employee Pension insurance (EP) will receive smaller pensions.2
Such reductions, as well as other changes in social security beneﬁts and
taxes, are likely to aﬀect the number of older persons active in the labor
market during the next few decades.
In the ﬁrst section of this paper, therefore, I look at the recent employ-
ment history of Japanese men in this age group. Between the 1970s and
the late 1980s their rate of participation in the labor market declined stead-
ily; it rose in the early 1990s, then fell again between 1993 and 1996. Sev-
eral economists (e.g., Seike and Shimada 1994) argue that the expansion
of social security beneﬁts in the 1970s is responsible for the decreasing
employment rate for this group through the late 1980s. My initial focus on
the subsequent rebound in paid employment of the early 1990s suggests
severale x planations for that rise. I then examine the eﬀect on the labor
supply of men aged sixty to sixty-four resulting from changes in the pen-
sion beneﬁt scheme of the EP program. Throughout the paper I refer to
workers sixty to sixty-four years old who have already applied for EP bene-
ﬁtsa nd are therefore eligible to receive thema sEP eligibles; people who
are likely to qualify for EP beneﬁts but have not yet applied for them are
potential EP eligibles.3
In the past decade the Japanese government has cut pension beneﬁts
for working EP eligibles. In response to the criticism that such reductions
distort labor supply of the elderly, the government several times has re-
formed the rules governing beneﬁt reductions in an attempt to eliminate
work disincentives. In the latter part of this paper, I examine the eﬀect of
these rule changes by comparing labor supply of older workers before and
after the reform of the Employees’ Pension Insurance Act (EPIA) insti-
tuted in 1989. The data I use come from the Survey on Employment Con-
ditions of Older Persons (SECOP) for 1983, 1988, and 1992. Although
EPIA reforms aﬀectE Peligibles aged sixty to sixty-four, they do not apply
to those aged sixty-ﬁve or older, nor to workers covered by non-EP public
pension programs. I was therefore able to use the latter two groups as a
control group for evaluating the response of EP eligibles to EPIA reform
and its eﬀecto nthe labor supply of men in this age group.
Even though regression estimates indicate that reductions in beneﬁts
that are related to earnings generally discourage labor supply of the
2. While nonworkers aged sixty to sixty-four stop making social security contributions,
they will receive only the proportional part of the pension beneﬁts (i.e., the amount propor-
tional to their individual lifetime contributions). After age sixty-ﬁve, they will receive the base
part (the standard pension amount received by all seniors) as well as the proportional part.
3. Application for determination of entitlement (saitei)b yc overed individuals (those who
contributed to the EP before age sixty) is the necessary condition for receiving EP beneﬁts.
Based on this application, the beneﬁt amount for the individual is calculated. Although the
starting age for receiving EP beneﬁts is sixty, many individuals covered by the program do
not apply for EP beneﬁts at that age.
274 Yukiko Abeaﬀected group, the 1989 EPIA reforms do not seem to have signiﬁcantly
encouraged employment among men aged sixty to sixty-four.
According to several other studies comparing the earnings distribution
of EP eligibles and EP noneligibles (Tachibanaki and Shimono 1994; Seike
and Shimada 1994), EP eligibles avoid beneﬁt reductions by adjusting
their earnings.4 However, while many of these studies suggest that reduc-
tionsi nbeneﬁts distort labor supply, none of the models used explicitly
includes the institutional fact that beneﬁt reductions apply only to EP eli-
gibles who participate in EP at ages sixty to sixty-four. This fact has impor-
tant implications for evaluations of the government’s beneﬁt reduction
scheme, for the reasons outlined below.
There are several ways for working EP eligibles not to participate in EP,
and thus to avoid beneﬁt reductions. Employees’ Pension beneﬁts are cut
only if the worker participates in EP through his or her current employer
(i.e., pays the EP premium out of current earnings). In general, EP partici-
pation is required only when the following three conditions are all met:
The workeri sless than sixty-ﬁve years old, is employed in a private-sector
establishment with more than ﬁve regular employees or in an incorporated
enterprise of any number of employees, and works more hours than three-
quarters of the regular employees in the same establishment. A worker
whod oes not meet these qualiﬁcations—for example, by working outside
the private sector, part-time, or in self-employment—does not have to par-
ticipate in EP. Based on my analysis shown below, about 30 percent of
working EP-eligible males choose to work under conditions in which EP
participation is notr e q u i r e d .T his sizable proportion of nonparticipating,
working EP eligibles suggests then that beneﬁt reductions are likely to
aﬀectl abor supply by making self-employment, part-time work, or public-
sector employment more attractive to those who might otherwise choose
to workf ull-time in the private sector.
Because beneﬁt reduction is most likely to aﬀect the likelihood of and
the hours of private-sector employment, I analyze overall labor force par-
ticipation and private-sector employment separately in this paper. This
procedure contrasts sharply with that of previous studies, which either ex-
amine work-hours decisions without regard to choice of work mode or fail
to distinguish among various kinds of work, even though beneﬁt reduction
has diﬀerent implications for diﬀerent work modes.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 9.2,Ip r esent an overview
of the trend in the labor supply of Japanese men aged sixty to sixty-four.
In section 9.3, I explain the EP beneﬁt rule for active workers and review
its history from the 1980s to the present. In section 9.4, I explain the Sur-
4. Seike and Shimada (1994) employ a labor supply model that incorporates selection bias.
Ogawa (1997) studies labor force participation by using a binary choice model. Amemiya
and Shimono (1989) use a nested logit model to examine workers’ choices among full-time
work,p a rt-time work, and no work.
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Shu ¯gyo ¯ Jittai Cho ¯sa), which is the data set used in this paper. In section
9.5, I explain the descriptive statistics of work-mode choice and hours. In
section 9.6, estimates fromareduced-form analysis arep r esented. The
paperc o ncludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the
ﬁndings.
9.2 Overview of the Labor Supply of Men Aged Sixty to Sixty-Four
Between 1967 and the late 1980s, the labor force participation of sixty-
to sixty-four-year-old Japanese men decreased; it then increased until 1993
before again declining somewhat between 1993 and 1996. This transition
is shown in ﬁgure 9.1. The ﬁrst decline is often attributed to the expansion
of public pension beneﬁts during the same period (e.g., Seike 1993). Pos-
siblee x planations for the rebound in employment from 1990 to 1993 in-
clude (a) increases in the mandatory retirement age and its spillover eﬀects
on older workers; (b) the government policy of subsidizing the hiring of
older workers; (c) strong labor demand in the Japanese economy from the
late 1980s to the early 1990s, and (d) reforms in EP beneﬁt rules.5
All of these factors are likely to increase the private-sector employment
of men aged sixty to sixty-four. In fact, as shown in ﬁgure 9.2, the propor-
tion of private-sector employment (wage and salary workers, excluding
those who work on a temporary basis) among men in this age group in-
5. The EP beneﬁt rule adopted in 1995 is expected to be less distortionary than the ones
that preceded it.
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Fig. 9.1 Aggregate male labor force participation of men aged sixty to sixty-four
Source: Labor Force Survey, Statistical Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency,
various years.creased dramatically from 1988 to 1993 and continued to increase slightly
until 1996. This rise occurred even though the overall labor force partici-
pation of the group declined between 1993 and 1996. The proportion of
private-sector employment for men aged sixty to sixty-four rose from 30
percent in 1983 to 37 percent in 1996. The corresponding ﬁgures for the en-
tire male population were 50 percent in 1983 and 53 percent in 1996; thus
the increase in private-sector employment for the older group was higher
than the economy-wide average.6 It is quite possible that while the reces-
sion of the mid-1990s reduced the number of older workers employed,
there were oﬀsetting institutional forces that contributed to an overall
increase.
9.2.1 Extension of the Mandatory Retirement Age
The ﬁrst such force may have been raising the mandatory retirement
age. In many ﬁrms the mandatory age of retirement was raised gradually
during the 1980s and 1990s, as shown in table 9.1. Large ﬁrms tended to
raise it earlier than small or medium-sized ﬁrms. In 1992, for example,
95.2 percent of ﬁrms with more than 5,000 employees had a mandatory
retirement age of sixty. This ﬁgure was 67.5 percent for ﬁrms with thirty
to ninety-nine employees in 1992 and 73.6 percent in 1995. Some analysts
have suggested that this change causes people aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty to
work more hours, and to be more likely to work full time.
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Fig. 9.2 Proportion of private-sector employment among men aged sixty
to sixty-four
Source: Labor Force Survey, Statistical Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency,
various years.
Note: Theﬁ gure is (private-sector employed males aged sixty to sixty-four)/(total number of
males aged sixty to sixty-four).
6. The comparable ﬁgure for men aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine increased even more dramati-
cally, from 47 percent in 1983 to 63 percent in 1996. A large part of this increase was probably
due to the rise in the mandatory retirement age.9.2.2 Government Subsidies for Hiring Older Workers
TheJ apanese Ministry of Labor administers several programs to en-
courage companies to hire older workers. The programs include (a) a sub-
sidy for introducing the practice of continuous employment for workers
over age sixty-one (Keizoku Koyo ¯ Seido Donyu ¯ Sho ¯rei-kin), (b) a subsidy
for hiring a high proportion of older workers in the work force (Ko ¯rei-sha
Tasu ¯ Koyo ¯ Sho ¯rei-kin), (c) a subsidy for introducing equipment suited to
the needs of older workers (Kounenrei-sha Koyo ¯ Kankyo ¯ Seibi Shorei-
kin), and (d) a subsidy for oﬀering paid holidays to workers who use them
to improve their employment skills in their old age (Ko ¯rei-ki Shu ¯gyo ¯ Junbi
Sho ¯rei-kin). These subsidies are provided to employers who introduce sys-
tems that increase or facilitate the hiring of older workers. Furthermore,
hiring greater numbers of older workers may entitle employers to addi-
tional subsidies. For example, they may qualify to receive the Subsidy for
Employment Development for Special Workers (Tokutei Kyu ¯syoku-sha
Koyo ¯ Sho ¯rei-kin) by using public job-placement oﬃces to hire workers
aged ﬁfty-ﬁve or older. All of these subsidies are ﬁnanced by the Employ-
ment Insurance Account (the Japanese equivalent of unemployment in-
surance).7
9.3 Beneﬁt Reduction in Employees’ Pension Insurance
Until the year 2000, EP eligibles began receiving beneﬁts at age sixty;
the startinga ge forr eceiving EP is scheduled to rise gradually between
2001 and 2013 (for men). Under the reformed rules, EP eligibles aged sixty
to sixty-four, as explained in note 2, will receive only the part of the pen-
sion that is proportional to their lifetime EP contributions; they will not
Table 9.1 Distribution of Firms by Their Mandatory Retirement Age (percent)
Below 55 55 56–59 60 Over 60
1980 0.2 39.5 20.1 36.5 3.2
1983 0.3 31.3 19.0 45.8 3.6
1985 0.1 27.0 17.4 51.0 4.4
1988 0.6 23.6 17.1 55.0 3.8
1992 0.2 11.5 11.7 71.4 5.2
1995 7.6 6.6 78.6 7.2
Source: Employment Management Survey (Koyo Kanri Cho ¯sa).
278 Yukiko Abe
7. In 1995, Employment Insurance started providing subsidies to older insured people who
continue to work after age sixty (Ko ¯rei-sha Koyo ¯ Keizoku Kyu ¯fu). According to the Annual
Report on Employment Insurance (Ministry of Labor 1995) the total amount paid through
this system in 1995 was 10.9 billion yen (for seven months). The eﬀecto fthis subsidy is not
addressed in this paper, because the most recent data available are from 1992.receive the base beneﬁts until they reach age sixty-ﬁve (Ministry of Health
and Welfare of Japan 1996).
Any model of the eﬀect of EP beneﬁt reduction on working beneﬁciaries
must consider three decisions a covered person must make. The ﬁrst, the
application decision, is whether (and when) to apply for EP beneﬁts some-
time after the age of sixty. The second is the work-mode choice, since the
beneﬁt reduction scheme treats diﬀerent types of jobs very diﬀerently. The
ﬁnal decision relates to the number of hours the worker chooses to work.
Thes equence of decisions described below is illustrated in ﬁgures 9.3
and 9.4.
9.3.1 Application Decision
As explained in note 3, application for determination of entitlement
(saitei)b ythe covered individual is the necessary precondition for receiv-
ing EP beneﬁts. A sizable proportion of qualiﬁed individuals (potential
EP eligibles) does not ﬁle for EP beneﬁts at age sixty. Based on a cross-
sectional calculation from the 1992 Annual Report of the Social Insurance
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Fig. 9.3 Work-hours decision for male worker aged sixty to sixty-four by
Employees’ PensionAgency, only about 57 percent of covered males apply at age sixty. About
21 percent apply between the ages of sixty-one and sixty-four, and most
of the remainder apply at age sixty-ﬁve. Only 3 percent apply after age
sixty-six.
The fact that less than 60 percent of covered individuals apply at the
earliest possible age (sixty) is somewhat surprising. Because EP beneﬁts
are aﬀected by the number of years a worker contributes to the program,
somem ay want to increase their beneﬁts by extending the period of contri-
bution.M oreover, a delayed application does not cause a loss in cumula-
tive beneﬁts, because beneﬁts for up to the ﬁve years preceding the appli-
cation are paid once a worker’s entitlement has been determined. Since
most people ﬁle by the age of sixty-ﬁve, the only loss caused by a late
application is the interest that workers could earn on the beneﬁts due to
them from the age of sixty.8 It is likely that covered individuals who do not
apply at age sixty face no liquidity constraints and choose to work. In that
sense, the application decision and the decision to participate in the labor
market are very closely related, and both should be treated as endogenous.
Although the SECOP data sets do not ask speciﬁcally about application
status, the sample includes many male workers aged sixty to sixty-four
who weree m p l o y e di nthe private sector at age ﬁfty-ﬁve (and so are likely
8. Because the past beneﬁts paid at the time entitlement is determined (after age sixty) are
the sum of past beneﬁts, late application results in the loss of interest that might have accrued
if the determination had taken place earlier. If a covered individual faces liquidity constraints
after age sixty, therefore, it does not make sense to delay application.
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Fig. 9.4 Work-hours decision for Employees’ Pension eligible or potential eligible
male worker aged sixty to sixty-fourto be covered by the EP) and who receive no EP beneﬁts between sixty
and sixty-four. Such individuals either have not ﬁled the application for
EP beneﬁts or have ﬁled but have incomes too high to receive beneﬁts.
The SECOP data sets do not allow me to distinguish between these two
cases precisely. However, the number of people who can be put in either
of these categories is much higher than the estimated number of those in
the second category, which can be calculated by using the published data
in the Annual Report of the Social Insurance Agency. This fact suggests
that it is important to consider the possibility of nonapplication in analyz-
ing the eﬀects of beneﬁt reductions on the labor supply of men in this
age group.
9.3.2 Work-Mode and Hours Decisions
Thes econdd ecision individuals must make concerns the mode and
hours of work. As noted earlier, working EP eligibles aged sixty to sixty-
four, who are wage or salary workers in the private sector and who work
more hours than three-quarters of the ﬁrm’s regular workers must partici-
pate in EP (i.e., must pay EP premiums out of their current earnings)
until they reach age sixty-ﬁve. Under the EP beneﬁt reduction scheme, the
beneﬁts received by EP an participant aged sixty to sixty-four depends on
the level of employment income: An increase in employment income is
“taxed” by a reduction in EP beneﬁts.
Ther eduction rules for the years I analyze in this paper—1983, 1988,
and 1992—are shown in table 9.2, which also explains the rule in eﬀect
after April 1995 under the reformed EPIA of 1994. Before 1995, there were
many more “notches” in the budget constraints, which are likely to aﬀect
EP eligibles’ decisions about the trade-oﬀ between consumption and lei-
sure. There were four such notches until 1989, and eight between 1989 and
1995. Even after the 1994 reform, one notch still remained: the one at the
margin between work and no work. Overall, from 1983 to 1995 the rule
changed in the direction of encouraging participation in the labor force.
The typical budget constraints in 1983, 1992, and 1995 are shown in ﬁgure
9.5.9 The complicated beneﬁt rule put into eﬀecti n1992 increased dispos-
able incomes in the intermediate range of the budget constraint compared
with the situation before 1989. The 1994 reform eliminated most notches.
From 1986 to 2001, EP beneﬁts are reduced for EP eligibles aged sixty
to sixty-four, while those sixty-ﬁve or over receive full EP beneﬁts regard-
lesso ftheir labor income.10 However, until 1986, beneﬁt reduction was
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9. The graphs incorporate the following set of parameters: wage, 800 yen per hour; poten-
tial EP beneﬁts, 180,000 yen per month; living with spouse, no dependents. Continuing to
make contributions to EP between ages sixty and sixty-four increases future beneﬁts, but
this aspect is ignored in these ﬁgures.
10. Starting April of 2002, EP beneﬁt reduction is going to be applied to EP eligibles aged


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.also applied to those aged sixty-ﬁve or over. Before April 1986, EP beneﬁts
for those aged sixty-ﬁve or over with earnings of more than 160,000 yen
(per month) were reduced by 20 percent. This rule was more generous
than the one applied to workers sixty to sixty-four years old, who received
no beneﬁts at all for the same level of labor income. Thus the pre-1986
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Fig. 9.5 Budget constraint, with spouse (wage  800 yen/hour): (A), 1983 and
1988; (B), 1992; (C), 1995
A
Brule seems likelyt oh avee ncouraged work among men aged sixty-ﬁve or
over, while discouraging it for those aged sixty to sixty-four.
The work-mode choices shown in ﬁgure 9.3 are (a) participating in EP,
(b) working part time and not participating in EP, and (c) being self-
employed and not participating in EP. In each work mode, a worker de-
cides on working hours according to the budget constraint applicable to
that particular mode. In the EP-participation mode, for example, the ap-
plicable budget constraint is shown in ﬁgure 9.5. In the part-time mode,
limiting hours to less than three-quarters of those worked by regular work-
ers produces no cut in beneﬁts; in the self-employed mode, there are no
beneﬁt cuts at all. Employees’ Pension eligibles aged sixty to sixty-four
solve the problem in the following way. They ﬁrst determine the maximum
utility of each work-mode option, then compare the utilities and choose
the mode that yields the highest utility. Since the budget constraints for
diﬀerent work modes are diﬀerent, we need to identify each worker’s cho-
sen work mode.
Theb udget constraints applicable to potential EP eligibles are similar
to those for EP eligibles. Assuming that covered individuals ﬁle their appli-
cationsb ya ge sixty-ﬁve, they can, as noted earlier, collect the beneﬁts they
would have received between the ages of sixty and sixty-four. The amount
of beneﬁts paid for those years will depend on the employment income
earned. For example, if an individual’s earnings at age sixty-two are posi-
tive, then the beneﬁts corresponding to that year are cut based on the
earnings of that time (at age sixty-two). Therefore, the amount the worker
284 Yukiko Abe
Fig. 9.5 (cont.)
Creceivesf or past beneﬁts after his or her entitlement is adjusted according
to the labor income earned before ﬁling the application. Thus, as far as
choice of work mode and hours are concerned, EP eligibles and potential
EP eligibles are in a similar situation.11 For this reason, I consider them as
oneg roupw hen I analyze workers’ labor-supply decisions, as illustrated
in ﬁgures 9.3 and 9.4.
9.3.3 Identifying Chosen Decisions in the Data Set
The institutional structure discussed above must be incorporated into
any model for analyzing the eﬀects of the EP beneﬁt reduction scheme.
However, the SECOP data sets contain several ambiguities that make iden-
tifying the decisions made by individual workers diﬃcult. First, the survey
does nota sk respondents whether they have already ﬁled the application
forE Pbeneﬁts. Second, it does not ask whether they participate in EP.
Theq uestion on current employment status does allow us to identify those
whoa re currently self-employed or who work in other modes that do not
require EP participation. It remains diﬃcult, however, to identify the ap-
plication status and EP-participation status of those employed in the pri-
vate sector. The main reasons for the diﬃculty are that (a) part-time,
private-sector workers may or may not participate in EP, and (b) EP bene-
ﬁtsf or high-income EP eligibles are cut to zero, so that these eligibles are
indistinguishable from workers who are not EP eligible. There is some evi-
dence that a sizable proportion of male part-time workers do not partici-
pate in EP, as the following analysis shows.
9.3.4 Evidence on Employees’ Pension Participation
Thea dministrative statistics of the Social Insurance Agency indicate
how many EP eligibles actually receive reduced EP beneﬁts. Until 1994,
around 20 percent of male EP eligibles aged sixty to sixty-four (those who
applied for EP beneﬁts after age sixty) worked, participated in EP, and re-
ceivedr educedor zero beneﬁts. That proportion rose to 28 percent in 1995,
the year in which both the 1994 EPIA reform and Employment Insurance
employment-continuation beneﬁts for workers aged sixty to sixty-four
were put into eﬀect( see table 9.3).12 These changes made working in the
private sector more attractive for older people and so are likely to have
increased EP participation among EP eligibles.
Theﬁ gures, however, are much lower than the 1994 Labor Force Sur-
vey’s proportion of private-sector employment, which was 36 percent.
Since the data in the Labor Force Survey are based on the entire popula-
tion and not on EP eligibles alone, part of the discrepancy may be attribut-
11. It is important to keep in mind that the potential EP eligibles are not included in some
of the governmental statistics on EP eligibles.
12. Under the employment-continuation beneﬁt, older workers who experience large wage
decline can receive wage subsidy.
Employees’ Pension Beneﬁts and Labor Supply of Older Workers 285able to diﬀerences in the labor supply behavior of EP eligibles and others.
However, the diﬀerences also could be attributable to two other factors:
(a) nonapplication to the EP by qualiﬁed individuals at age sixty, and (b)
nonparticipation by EP eligibles who work part time. Potential EP eligibles
arem ore likely to work than EP eligibles; thus the probability that EP
eligibles work is likely to be lower than the one calculated for a group that
also includes potential EP eligibles.13 When EP eligibles work part time
and choose not to participate in EP, neither they nor their employers are
required to pay the EP premium. In addition, EP eligibles who work part
time receive full beneﬁts, but they lose the opportunity to increase their
future EP beneﬁts through a longer period of contribution.
The EP-participation decision may also be inﬂuenced by the worker’s
desire to participate in an employer-provided health insurance plan.14
13. Probability of working—that is, the ratio of the number of people who worked to the
population as a whole—is used as one measure of labor supply in this paper. It diﬀers from
labor force participation, which includes unemployed workers in the numerator. The SECOP-
IP questionnaire does not speciﬁcally ask people whether they have searched for jobs in a
given period, which is part of the standard deﬁnition of unemployment.
14. There is a signiﬁcant variation in the National Health Insurance premium across mu-
nicipalities. Furthermore, employer-provided health insurance is more generous in beneﬁts
than National Health Insurance and allows the insured to cover family members at no addi-
tional cost. Therefore, if the National Health Insurance premium is high in an area or the
Table 9.3 Employees’ Pension Participation and Beneﬁt Reduction among Those
Eligible, Aged Sixty to Sixty-Four
EP Participation EP Participation
and and Beneﬁt Reduction





Source: Numbers of EP eligibles (i.e., denominators) are from the Social Insurance Agency’s
annual report: the 1992 number is from the 1992 report (published in 1994); 1993 numbers,
the 1995 report; 1994 numbers, the 1996 report; and 1995 numbers, the 1997 report. Numbers
forE Pp articipation and beneﬁt reduction (i.e., numerators) are from Summary of the Social
Insurance Policy (1995).
Notes: Theﬁ gures are calculated as the number of those who received reduced beneﬁts or
zero beneﬁts (due-to-the-means test) out of the total number of male EP eligibles aged sixty
to sixty-four. The potential EP eligibles, who have not yet applied for EP beneﬁts, are ex-
cluded from both the numerator and the denominator.
Basically, the EP beneﬁt reduction applies only to workers sixty to sixty-four years old.
However, there are rare cases in which people aged sixty-ﬁve or more face the beneﬁt reduc-
tion, because of the transitional arrangements. Since the Social Insurance Agency does not
publish the number of sixty- to sixty-four-year-old EP participants classiﬁed by sex, the nu-
merator of the calculation for 1992–95 is slightly larger than the actual number of male EP
participants in that age group.
286 Yukiko AbeSince the criteria for participating in EP and participating in employer-
provided health insurance are the same for those aged sixty-four or
younger, iti sd i ﬃcult to enroll in an employer’s health plan without also
participating in EP. Thus a part-time worker who strongly prefers the
employer-provided health insurance to the National Health Insurance
might choose to participate in EP even though that requires payment of
the EP premium and, possibly, reduces EP beneﬁts.
Table 9.4 lists the summary statistics on EP participation and employer-
based health insurance coverage from the Ministry of Labor’s General
Survey of Part-Time Workers (GSPTW) for 1990 and 1995 (see Ministry
of Labor 1992, 1997). These statistics are calculated for part-time workers
of all ages and not solely for the EP-eligible workers aged sixty to sixty-
four.15 In 1990, almost 20 percent of male workers who worked fewer hours
than regular employees participated in EP and receivedh e alth insurance
provided by the employer; that ﬁgure increased to 37 percent in 1995.
Furthermore, 20 to 30 percent of male part-time workers who worked as
many hours as regular workers did not participate in EP. Although these
ﬁgures are only indirect evidence of EP participation by male EP eligibles
in the sixty- to sixty-four-year-old age group who work part time, they
suggest that it is probably misleading to assume either that no part-time
workers participate inE Po rt h a tall of them do.
9.4 Data Description
I turn now to an analysis of the EP beneﬁt reduction scheme and its
eﬀecto nthe male labor supply of Japan, using the microdata sets of the
Survey on Employment Conditions of Older Persons for 1983, 1988, and
1992. The SECOP consists of two surveys, one for individuals and the
Table 9.4 Proportion of Participation in Employees’ Pension and Employer-
Provided Health Insurance







Source: Ministry of Labor (1992, 1997).
worker has family members to insure, it makes more sense to participate in employer-
provided health insurance.
15. As the survey questionnaire of GSPTW does not ask about the public pension under
whicha ni ndividual is covered, it is diﬃcult to identify EP eligibles.
Employees’ Pension Beneﬁts and Labor Supply of Older Workers 287other for establishments.16 TheI ndividual Persons ﬁle (IP), a cross-
sectional survey of individuals between the ages of ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-nine,
asks for detailed information on employment, labor income, pension type
and amount received, nonlabor income, work history, and household char-
acteristics.17 The variables used in the analysis are explained below.18
9.4.1 Employees’ Pension Eligibility
To analyze the eﬀects of EP beneﬁt reduction on labor supply, we need
to identify the type of public pension covering each individual. The 1983
IP survey questionnaire asked respondents directly about their eligibility
forapublic pension. The questionnaires for 1988 and 1992, however, in-
quired about the amount of EP beneﬁts received but did not ask speciﬁ-
cally about eligibility. Obviously, those who received positive EP beneﬁts
were EP eligibles. The ambiguity arises from two other groups: The ﬁrst
group includes covered individuals who do not apply for EP beneﬁts at
ages ixty but remain potential EP eligibles; the second group contains EP
eligibles whose beneﬁts are cut to zero because their labor income is too
high (see table 9.2). According to the Annual Report of the Social Insur-
ance Agency (1992), about 9 percent of EP eligibles who work and partici-
pate in EP receive no EP beneﬁts for this second reason. As mentioned in
the preceding section, the economic conditions for potential EP eligibles
who worka nd forE Peligibles who receive zero beneﬁts are similar, so I
assume that both of them belong to the EP group. In the following discus-
sion, therefore, I try to draw from the IP data set the combined number of
potential EP eligibles and EP eligibles whose EP beneﬁts are cut to zero.
There is no direct way to identify these two groups in the IP data set for
1988 and 1992. Therefore, following a procedure similar to the one em-
ployed by Ogawa (1997), I assume that a person with the following set of
characteristics is an EP eligible, even though he received zero EP beneﬁts:
(a) He worked more than thirty-two hours per week; (b) his labor income
16. The establishment survey of the SECOP asks detailed questions about the number of
older workers employed and the employment status of such workers in the organization.
17. Seike and Shimada (1994) based their analysis on the SECOP-IP data set for 1983;
Tachibanaki and Shimono (1985) and Amemiya and Shimono (1989) used the data set for
1980; and Ogawa (1997) used 1983, 1988, and 1992 data sets.
18. In this study, I include people who answered no to the question “Were you an employee
whenyou were 55?” This sample selection diﬀers from that used by Seike and Yamada (1996),
who included only those who answered yes to this question. Many individuals who answered
no did in fact work at a later stage in life and, in 75 percent of such cases, they were self-
employed. What is likely to have happened is that they became self-employed before age ﬁfty-
ﬁve and continued to be self-employed thereafter. Because the questionnaire asks whether the
respondent was “an employee” at age ﬁfty-ﬁve, some of the self-employed people may have
answered no. Self-employed individuals can receive EP beneﬁts if they participated in the
EP sometime during their working lives. In fact, 16 percent of the sixty- to sixty-nine-year-
old males who answered no to the question and were working at the times of the surveys
received positive EP beneﬁts.
288 Yukiko Abewash i gher than the threshold at which EP beneﬁts were reduced to zero;
(c) he worked in the private sector as an employee at the time of the survey;
(d) he worked in the private sector at age ﬁfty-ﬁve; (e) he did not receive
high beneﬁts (more than 50,000 yen per month) from a Mutual Aid Asso-
ciation (MAA) pension program; and (f) he was between sixty and sixty-
four years old. Criteria (a) and (c) ensure that the person makes EP contri-
butionso ut of current labor income, which is a precondition for reductions
in EP beneﬁts. I assign a person who meets criteria (a), (c), (d), and (f) to
the potential EP-eligible category if his receipts from all public pension
programs are zero.19 The idea behind this last condition is that if a person
had claimed beneﬁts from any of the public pension programs to which
he contributed in the past, he probably would have applied for EP beneﬁts
as well.
The assignment of EP eligibility (including potential EP eligibility) in
this way creates a sample EP group in which 15 percent of the observations
receive zero beneﬁts. This rather high proportion is understandable if it is
caused by nonapplication.20 Nonetheless, the procedure described above
may cause one to classify someone who is unrelated to EP as an EP eligible
orap otential EP eligible. For this reason, I base the analysis in this paper
on two separate samples. Sample 1 includes all EP eligibles and potential
EP eligibles as explained above. Sample 2 includes EP eligibles who receive
positive EP beneﬁts but excludes those who either (a) receive zero beneﬁts
because their labor income is too high, or (b) are potential EP eligibles
whod on ot seemt oh avea pplied to EP beneﬁts even though they are
likely to have contributed to EP. Sample 1 might contain some non-EP in-
dividuals who are misclassiﬁed as EP eligibles (or potential EP eligibles).
Sample 2 is likely to be free from classiﬁcation errors but is a biased sample
because it excludes those who endogenously choose to earn high income
or choose not to apply for EP beneﬁts.21
9.4.2 Pension Income
TheI Pq uestionnaire asks for the amount of pension beneﬁts received
by an individual from particular types of pension. The categories are EP
(beneﬁts given separately for working beneﬁciaries and others), National
Pension (NP), Mutual Aid Association (MAA), company-provided pen-
19. The reasons for imposing conditions (a) and (c) for identifying potential EP eligibles
arew eak. I also experimented with a sample by dropping these conditions in assigning poten-
tial EP eligibles and found that some of the results are sensitive to such diﬀerences.
20. In fact, of those individuals I assigned to the nonapplication category, 33 percent are
sixtyy ears old and only 12 percent are sixty-four. (Note that I assigned only those aged sixty
to sixty-four.) This pattern is consistent with the ﬁnding that more people ﬁnish their EP
application as they get older.
21. Note that Sample 1 includes more workers than Sample 2 does. This is because men
excluded from Sample 2 but included in Sample 1 are those who work. Sample 2 is a biased
sample, but whether Sample 1 includes the “right” number of workers is not clear.
Employees’ Pension Beneﬁts and Labor Supply of Older Workers 289sions, and others (including private pensions purchased by the respon-
dent). The EP beneﬁts consist of the basic part and allowances for spouse
and dependent children. The basic part is the sum of base beneﬁts and
the earnings related part. The amount of the latter is proportional to the
individual’s lifetime EP contributions. The allowances are not cut as labor
income increases unless the beneﬁts from the basic part become zero.
When the worker’s labor income hits the highest threshold for reduction
(250,000 yen in 1992), the allowances for spouse and dependent children
are eliminated. Since the amounts of the allowances for spouse and depen-
dent children are not recorded in the data set, I base my analysis solely on
the reported EP beneﬁts for the basic part.22
The actual amount of pension received (asked in the IP survey) is not
equal to the potential amount because the former is adjusted depending
on labor income. Since the survey did not ask respondents how much they
would receive if they were not working (potential EP beneﬁts), that
amount must be estimated. Ogawa (1997) developed the method to do
this, which I have basically followed for determining the amount of an
individual’s potential EP beneﬁts. For individuals whose labor income is
high enough to cut EP beneﬁts to zero, I have assigned a potential amount
that is the mean value of nonworking individuals who receive EP beneﬁts
in full and have similar characteristics (in terms of birth year and occupa-
tion at age ﬁfty-ﬁve or at retirement).
9.4.3 Weekly Hours
As the IP questionnaire asks separately about working hours per day
and working days per week, I multiply the two ﬁgures to obtain hours of
workp er week. For a typical answer of eight hours per day and six days
perw e ek, I assign the number of weekly hours as forty-four, because one
of the six working days is likely to be a half day. I eliminate weekly hours
aboves eventyf rom the sample, since such ﬁgures are likely to be outliers
foro lder workers.
9.4.4 Household Characteristics
TheI Psurvey asked three questions related to household characteris-
tics: (a) the number of people in the household, (b) the number of working
individuals in the household, and (c) the respondent’s main source of in-
come. Following earlier researchers, I assume that respondents belong to
oneo fthe following ﬁve household categories: (a) single, onei ndividual
living alone; (b) couple, at w o-person household in which the respondent
is supported by himself or by his spouse; (c) living with dependent children,
22. It is diﬃcult to arrive at any approximate ﬁgure for allowances without information
on the characteristics that determine eligibility for allowances (e.g., age and/or income of
spouse or children).
290 Yukiko Abeah ousehold consisting of more than three individuals in which the respon-
dent is self-supporting or is supported by his spouse; (d) supported by chil-
dren, ah ousehold that consists of more than two individuals with the re-
spondent is supported by his children; and (e) none of the above.
9.5 Descriptive Statistics from the SECOP-IP
Thel abor force participation statistics I cited earlier in the paper are
based on the entire population of men aged sixty to sixty-four. The
SECOP-IP data sets, however, allow me to compare the eﬀects on labor
supply of people covered by diﬀerent public pension programs (in particu-
lar, EP and non-EP programs). As explained above, I use two samples to
check for possible classiﬁcation errors. Sample 1 includes EP eligibles and
potential EP eligibles; Sample 2 excludes some of the EP eligibles and po-
tential EP eligibles included in Sample 1.
Table 9.5 organizes the four measures of labor supply of men I derived
from the SECOP-IP data according to the type of public pension received
(EP and non-EP). For each age group the measures describe (a) the pro-
Table 9.5 Labor Supply of Men Aged Fifty-Five to Sixty-Five, 1983–92
60  Age  64
Age  65
55  EP EP
Age  59 (Sample 1) (Sample 2) NonEP EP NonEP
Percentage worked
1983 0.862 0.539 0.466 0.777 0.484 0.602
1988 0.898 0.627 0.449 0.701 0.430 0.614
1992 0.938 0.668 0.505 0.737 0.504 0.621
Percentage employed
1983 0.590 0.367 0.274 0.346 0.326 0.167
1988 0.645 0.487 0.243 0.256 0.250 0.198
1992 0.672 0.538 0.312 0.296 0.326 0.222
Percentage full-time
1983 0.779 0.419 0.327 0.601 0.364 0.408
1988 0.781 0.484 0.238 0.444 0.252 0.369




1983 44.13 39.63 37.55 42.00 39.11 38.67
1988 43.47 39.34 32.44 37.11 33.80 35.87
1992 43.87 40.04 35.58 38.43 33.82 36.44
Source: Author’s calculation from Survey on Employment Conditions of Older Persons (SECOP), 1983,
1988, and 1992.
Note: Sample 1 contains individuals who receive no EP beneﬁts but are likely to be EP eligibles or
potential EP eligibles; Sample 2 excludes them.
Employees’ Pension Beneﬁts and Labor Supply of Older Workers 291portion working, (b) the proportion employed in the private sector as wage
or salary earners, (c) the proportion working full time (thirty-ﬁve hours or
more perw e ek), and (d) the average number of hours worked per week
calculated among workers. I distinguish between the percentage of work-
ing and the percentage of those employed in the private sector because EP
beneﬁt reduction applies only to EP eligibles in the private sector. Reﬂect-
ing the fact that the mandatory retirement age was raised from ﬁfty-ﬁve
to sixty, the proportion of men working in this age group increased be-
tween 1983 and 1992. For non-EP individuals sixty to sixty-four years old,
the proportion decreased from 1983 to 1988 and then increased. For the
combined group of EP eligibles and potential EP eligibles (Sample 1), the
percentage working increased steadily from 1983 to 1992. On the other
hand, the proportion of those working in the subsample of EP eligibles
(Sample 2) decreased from 1983 to 1988 and then increased in 1992. In
most categories, the number of hours worked decreased and then in-
creased during this time period.
The 1983, 1988, and 1992 distributions of work hours for sixty- to sixty-
four-year-old men, classiﬁed by public pension types (EP group includes
potential EP eligibles), are shown in ﬁgures 9.6 to 9.11. The numbers for
all groups and all years show the largest clusters of work hours at the
points for no work and full-time work. The graphs indicate clearly that EP
eligibles are less likely to work than others, but also that a larger propor-
tion of EP eligibles worked in 1992 than before that time.
TheJ apanese government has recently adopted policies to shorten the
maximum regular working hours of workers in the Japanese labor mar-
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Fig. 9.6 Employees’ Pension noneligible men, 1983ket.23 Beginning in April 1997, the legal maximum was forty hours per
week for all employers. According to the General Survey on Wages and
Working Hours System of the Ministry of Labor (various years), the pro-
portion of ﬁrms with regular work weeks of forty hours or less was 14.8
percent in 1980, versus 35 percent in 1992. The same trend is discernible
in the proportion of ﬁrms with more than forty-four regular working hours,
whichd e clined from 54.6 percent in 1980 to 21.9 percent in 1992.24 While
the legal maximum on work hours applies to workers of all ages, this
change in policy clearly has aﬀected the hours-distribution of older work-
ers. As shown in ﬁgures 9.8 through 9.11, the proportion of older workers
working forty-four hours or more declined between 1988 and 1992 and the
proportion of those working forty hours increased.
9.6 Reduced-Form Analysis of Male Labor Supply
I turn next to a reduced-form regression analysis of labor supply. The
regression equation I estimate has the form
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Fig. 9.7 Employees’ Pension eligible men, 1983
23. The restriction was ﬁrst applied to large ﬁrms or growing industries and was later
applied to smaller ﬁrms.
24. These ﬁgures are based on the weekly hours applied to most of a ﬁrm’s employees.
Increases in the number of part-time workers, therefore, are not likely to aﬀect this ﬁgure
even though that would make average hours of work smaller. The same ﬁgure weighted by
the number of employees also appears in the survey; it shows a rise in the number of those
working forty hours or less per week from 45.3 percent in 1980 to 67.4 percent in 1992.(Worked or Employed) Probit (Year Dummies)
(Year Dummies Age60
EP Eligibility EP Probability Age60
EP Eligibility Age60 Year Dummies)


























Fig. 9.8 Employees’ Pension noneligible men, 1988
Fig. 9.9 Employees’ Pension eligible men, 1988Log(Weekly Hours) (Year Dummies)
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Fig. 9.10 Employees’ Pension noneligible men, 1992
Fig. 9.11 Employees’ Pension eligible men, 1992The dependent variables are likelihood of working, likelihood of private-
sector employment as a wage or salary earner, and weekly hours. Hours
equations are estimated for each sample of workers or employees. The
analysis of private-sector employment is included because EP beneﬁts are
cut only if an EP eligible works as a wage or salary earner in the private
sector. Because the EP beneﬁts formula for working beneﬁciaries changed
in 1989, I was able to use the available data to compare labor supply out-
comes before and after the policy change.
The summary statistics in table 9.5 show that the probability of working
forE Peligibles aged sixty to sixty-four (the group aﬀected by the policy
change) increased from 1988 to 1992, although that probability rose for
non-EP beneﬁciaries (i.e., the control group) as well. The interaction term
of EP eligibility, age sixty to sixty-four, and the year dummy for 1992 re-
veals the eﬀecto fthe policy change on EP eligibles (i.e., the treatment
group). In addition, as noted earlier, in 1983 EP beneﬁt reduction also
applied to EP eligibles aged sixty-ﬁve or over, although the beneﬁt sched-
ule used was diﬀerent from that applied to the sixty- to sixty-four-year-old
group at any time. To extract the change in labor supply behavior by the
group aﬀected by the 1989 EPIA reform, I include a set of interaction
terms of EP eligibility, age-category dummy, and year dummies. There are
eleven such interaction terms. The set of control variables includes dum-
mies for household characteristics, a dummy variable for having experi-
enced mandatory retirement, a dummy for not being an employee at age
ﬁfty-ﬁve, a dummy for living in Tokyo, a health-status dummy, the amount
of public pension received (the potential amount for EP eligibles), the
amount of company pension receipt, a dummy variable for MAA pension
beneﬁciaries, interaction terms of MAA and year dummies, and an inter-
action term of MAA and a dummy for having experienced mandatory re-
tirement.
Ther egression sample consists of men aged sixty to sixty-nine. I do not
include individuals aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine because the information on
their public pension status is not derivable from the data. (In any case,
most of these people do not yet receive pension beneﬁts.) I also exclude
observations for individuals about whom information on any of the vari-
ables included in the regression analysis is missing.25
Thed escriptive statistics for the total sample are shown in table 9.6.
First, using Sample 1 data, I estimate probit models for the decision to
25. An exception to this rule is treatment of a dummy for having experienced mandatory
retirement. In the SECOP-IP questionnaire, anyone who answered no to the question “Were
you an employee at age 55?” was not asked “Have you experienced mandatory retirement?”
(see note 18). For these men, because the dummy for having experienced mandatory retire-
ment is missing, I assign zero to the mandatory retirement dummy. I also include a dummy
variable for nonemployment at age ﬁfty-ﬁve for such individuals, to distinguish them from
men who have not retired from career jobs.
296 Yukiko Abeworka nd forp rivate-sector employment, and linear regressions for weekly
hours among workers (see table 9.7). Second, I estimate the same relation-
ship using Sample 2 data (as shown in table 9.8). Here are my main ﬁnd-
ings.
1. The coeﬃciento nadummy of EP eligibility indicates that labor
supply of EP eligibles and potential EP eligibles as a whole is not very dif-
ferent from that of other groups. However, EP eligibles aged sixty to sixty-
four, who face beneﬁt reductions if they work, are much less likely to work
than other EP eligibles; the coeﬃcientf rom Sample 2 suggests that they
are1 4percent less likely to be employed in the private sector. Furthermore,
Table 9.6 Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Sample
Sample 1 Sample 2
Mean S.D. Mean S.E.
Worked 0.622 0.485 0.588 0.492
Employed in the private sector 0.333 0.471 0.273 0.446
Full-time work (weekly hours  35) 0.435 0.496 0.384 0.486
Weekly hours (worked  1o nly) 38.18 14.58 37.10 15.15
Log hourly wage (10,000 yen) 0.158 0.192 0.152 0.195
Ages 60–64 0.576 0.494 0.538 0.499
Single 0.038 0.190 0.038 0.191
Couple 0.346 0.476 0.344 0.475
With dependent children 0.441 0.497 0.430 0.495
Supported by children 0.114 0.317 0.122 0.328
Live in Tokyo 0.092 0.289 0.089 0.285
Executives 0.079 0.269 0.062 0.242
Self-employed 0.212 0.409 0.231 0.421
NonEP joba 0.065 0.247 0.071 0.257
Experienced mandatory retirement 0.418 0.493 0.426 0.495
Good health 0.677 0.468 0.662 0.473
EP eligible (inc. potential eligible) 0.513 0.500 0.469 0.499
EP  Age 60–64 0.284 0.451 0.220 0.414
EP  Age 60–64  Year 1988 0.101 0.301 0.074 0.263
EP  Age 60–64  Year 1992 0.131 0.337 0.096 0.294
MAA 0.202 0.401 0.219 0.414
MAA  Year 1988 0.064 0.245 0.070 0.255
MAA  Year 1992 0.077 0.266 0.084 0.277
MAA  experienced mandatory retirement 0.132 0.339 0.144 0.351
Public pension (10,000 yen) 11.28 8.83 10.79 8.86
Company pension (10,000 yen) 0.33 2.00 0.31 1.89
N 20,796 19,226
Source: SECOP-IP data sets for 1983, 1988, and 1992.
Note: The sample consists of males aged 60 to 69. Hourly wage, the amount of public pen-
sion,a nd the amount of company pension are all deﬂated by CPI. For those who were not
employed at age 55, value 0 is assigned to the mandatory retirement dummy.
aSelf-employed jobs are excluded.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.when they do work, their weekly hours are shorter than those of other
workers.
2. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms of EP eligibility, a dummy
fora ge sixty to sixty-four, and year dummies (years 1988 and 1992) indi-
cate that the probability of working and the probability of private-sector
employment for EP eligibles aged sixty to sixty-four are higher for 1988
than for 1983 and continue to rise slightly from 1988 to 1992. The magni-
tude of these coeﬃcients in Sample 1 (table 9.7) and Sample 2 (table 9.8)
diﬀer rather signiﬁcantly, which makes it diﬃcult to draw a general conclu-
sion.F urthermore, the diﬀerence of the coeﬃcients of (EP)  (age 60–64)
 (Year 1988) and (EP)  (age 60–64)  (Year 1992) is statistically insig-
niﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on these variables in weekly hours equations are
generally positive but statistically insigniﬁcant. Although ﬁgures in table
9.5 indicate a large increase in the percentage of working and employed in
the privates ectora mong EP eligibles aged sixty to sixty-four between 1988
and 1992, other groups also increased their employment. Thus, the in-
creases for EP eligibles aged sixty to sixty-four were not signiﬁcantly larger
than those of the control group. This ﬁnding suggests that the 1989 EPIA
reform did not create a signiﬁcant labor supply response.26
3. Older people living in single-person households or being supported
by their children tend to work less than other groups do, while those with
a spouse or dependent children are more likely to work. Workers who ex-
perienced mandatory retirement are also less likely to work. Those who
answered “not an employee” at age ﬁfty-ﬁve were not so much less likely
to work than others, but they are much less likely to be employees: that is,
many of them are self-employed (see notes 18 and 25). Good health is also
an important factor for determining who works.
Ie stimate similar regression equations for a sample that excludes those
aged sixtyy ears old (results not shown). Because some men of this age
have not yet retired from their career jobs, their behavior may be diﬀerent
from that of workers sixty-one to sixty-four years old. Since the mandatory
retirement age has increased over time, excluding this group may provide
am orea c curate description of the labor supply of men in their early six-
ties.T he general pattern of the coeﬃcients for this group is similar to the
ones shown in tables 9.7 and 9.8, with the following exceptions. First, the
magnitude of the increase in labor supply of the EP group over time is
estimated to be somewhat smaller than in Samples 1 and 2, and sometimes
nots i gniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Second, unlike the results in tables
9.7 and 9.8, the increase in labor supply of EP eligibles aged sixty-one to
sixty-four between 1983 and 1988 is quite small (or insigniﬁcant) com-
paredt othe increase between 1988 and 1992.
26. In addition, the timing of the labor supply increase is somewhat at odds with that of
the policy change, which took eﬀecto nly in late 1989.
302 Yukiko AbeI also experiment with assigning a diﬀerent rule for potential EP eli-
gibles by dropping some of the conditions (see note 19). When I use the
sample created in this way to do the same analysis as above, the coeﬃ-
cients on most variables have a pattern similar to those shown in tables
9.7 and 9.8. However, the coeﬃcients on the interaction term of EP eligibil-
ity, the age sixty to sixty-four dummy, and the year dummies are somewhat
sensitive to the assignment of EP eligibility. Therefore, the ﬁnding number
2a bove is not as robust as the other two results.
In sum, EP beneﬁt reduction does appear to discourage labor supply,
although this tendency diminished somewhat between 1983 and 1992. It
is not clear that the 1989 reform of EPIA evoked any large labor supply
responsea mong the aﬀected group. After controlling for various character-
istics, I ﬁnd that the labor supply of EP eligibles aged sixty to sixty-four
had already begun to increase before 1989. Moreover, there is some evi-
dence that private-sector employment for this group continued to increase
between 1988 and 1992.
9.7 Conclusions and Policy Implications
My analysis of the microdata for three points in time (1983, 1988, and
1992) yields three main ﬁndings about the eﬀecto fthe 1989 EPIA reform
on labor supply of Japan’s elderly men. First, EP beneﬁt reduction for
working beneﬁciaries causes EP eligibles aged sixty to sixty-four to work
less than others, suggesting that the beneﬁt reduction scheme in fact de-
presses the labor supply. Second, based on the regression analysis, it is not
clear that the 1989 EPIA reform (which raised the level of income at which
beneﬁt reduction took place) increased the labor supply of EP eligibles in
that age group. Controlling for year eﬀects and various personal character-
istics, I ﬁnd that labor supply of this group had already increased some-
what between 1983 and 1988, a time frame that does not coincide with the
1989 reform. Furthermore, labor supply of control groups also rose during
the same period. Finally, I ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of household charac-
teristics, health status, and status for mandatory retirement have the ex-
pected sign. The analysis also points to the importance of modeling the
pension-application decision and work-mode choice in evaluating any EP
beneﬁt reduction scheme.
The EP beneﬁt reduction scheme is a kind of means test for pension
beneﬁts: By cutting beneﬁts for those who have positive earnings, the gov-
ernment reduces expenditures while maintaining a stable income for older
citizens (although seniors lose leisure time). Such a “growth approach”
(i.e., one that increases the resources available for older people) is an at-
tractive choice for an aging economy such as that of Japan, for two rea-
sons. For one thing, older people are healthier than they used to be and so
can often continue working into their sixties. For another, such an ap-
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younger generations by increasing their contributions to public pension
programs.
As a way to diminish these concerns, however, the current administra-
tive rule for EP beneﬁt reductions may have serious loopholes. Workers
can avoid beneﬁt reduction by choosing particular modes of work; those
who successfully ﬁnd such forms of employment can receive full beneﬁts
without paying EP premiums, even though they have positive labor in-
come. Many such individuals receive beneﬁts as high as those of nonwork-
ers. On the other hand, those who choose to work full time in the private
sector and participate in the EP receive reduced beneﬁts and, furthermore,
must continue to pay EP premiums.27 Thus,h orizontal equity among EP
eligibles may be violated, depending on individuals’ choices of work mode.
Such loopholes may also have behavioral consequences, perhaps inﬂuenc-
ing workers in this age group to ﬁnd jobs outside the private sector, to
worko nly part time, or—because beneﬁt reduction is severe within the
same public pension program—to move across programs to avoid losing
beneﬁts. A more comprehensive means test might alleviate some of these
inequities.
The analysis I performed was limited to the reduced-form regression.
Since the EP beneﬁt reduction scheme creates nonlinearities in the budget
constraints in a critical fashion (as shown in panel C of ﬁg. 9.5) a model
to simulate the eﬀects of alternative policies will require us to perform
structural estimations.28 Il eave that task for future research.
References
Amemiya, T., and K. Shimono. 1989. An application of nested logit models to the
labor supply of the elderly. Economic Studies Quarterly 40:14–22.
Hattori, E. (editor). 1996. Nenkin no kiso-chisiki (Basic knowledge on pension).
Tokyo: Jiyu ¯ Kokumin Sha.
Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan. 1995. Nenkin to zaisei (Pension and its
ﬁnancing). Tokyo: Hoken.
———. 1996. Annual report on health and welfare 1994–1995. Tokyo: Japan Inter-
national Corporation of Welfare Services.
Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan and Social Insurance Agency, eds. 1987.
304 Yukiko Abe
27. Although future beneﬁts are increased somewhat because of a longer period of contri-
bution,s uch increases are usually quite modest.
28. The decision structure illustrated in ﬁgure 9.4 makes a structural analysis more compli-
cated than the standard labor supply analysis under nonlinear budget constraints. Neverthe-
less, structural estimation would enable us to simulate the eﬀects of such policy options as
reforms in the EP beneﬁt reduction scheme, use of a means tests for beneﬁt determination,
and elimination of the income tax deduction for pension beneﬁts.Kosei nenkin Hoken Ho ¯ kaisetsu (Guide to Employees’ Pension Insurance Act).
Tokyo: Shakai Hoken Ho ¯ki Kenkyu ¯kai.
Ministry of Labor. 1983, 1988, 1992. Survey on employment conditions of older
persons. Tokyo: Ministry of Labor.
———. 1992. General survey of part-time workers 1990. Ministry of Finance:
Printing Bureau.
———. 1995. Annual report on employment insurance. Tokyo: Ministry of Labor.
———. 1997. General survey of part-time workers 1995. Ministry of Finance:
Printing Bureau.
———. Various years. General survey on wages and working hours system. Tokyo:
Ministry of Labor.
Ogawa, H. 1997. “Nenkin ga ko ¯rei-sha no shu ¯gyo ¯ koudou ni ataeru eikyu ¯ ni tuite”
(Labor supply of the elderly and pension beneﬁts). In Nenkin seido kaikaku ga
shu ¯gyo ¯ intai koudou ni oyobosu eikyu ¯ ni kansuru kenkyu ¯ (Research on pension
reform on labor supply and retirement), 17–57. Tokyo: Japan Institute of Labor.
Oguchi, N., Y. Kimura, and T. Hatta. 1996. Redistribution eﬀects of the Japanese
public pension system. Review of Social Policy 5:25–52.
Ogura, S. 1994. The cost of aging: Public ﬁnance perspectives for Japan. In Eco-
nomics of aging in the United States and Japan: Economic trends, ed. Y.N o g u chi
and D. Wise, 139–73. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Seike, A. 1993. Ko ¯rei-ka shakai no ro ¯do ¯ shijo ¯ (Labor markets in an aged economy).
Tokyo: To ¯yo ¯ Keizai Shinpo Sha.
Seike, A., and H. Shimada. 1994. Social security beneﬁts and the labor supply of
the elderly in Japan. In Economics of aging in the United States and Japan: Eco-
nomic trends, ed.Y .N oguchi and D. Wise, 43–61. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press.
Seike, A., and A. Yamada. 1996. “Pension rich no jyoken” (The career job charac-
teristics and pension status of older people). Nihon Keizai Kenkyu ¯ (JCER Eco-
nomic Journal) 33:33–61.
Social Insurance Agency. Various years. Annual report (in Japanese). Tokyo: Social
Insurance Agency.
Statistical Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency. Various years. Labor
force survey.
Summary of the Social Insurance Policy. 1995. Heisei-7-nendo shakai-hoken jigyo ¯
no gaiko. Available at http://www1.mhlw.go.jp./houdou/0902/h0222–1.html.
Tachibanaki, T., and K. Shimono. 1985. Labor supply of the elderly: Their desires
and realities about full-time jobs, part-time jobs, self-employed jobs or retire-
ment. Keizai Kenkyu ¯ 36:239–50.
———. 1994. Kojin chochiku to life cycle (Personal saving and life cycle). Tokyo:
Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha.
Employees’ Pension Beneﬁts and Labor Supply of Older Workers 305